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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
enough to create a valid partnership if the regulatory statutes are not fol-
lowed in full. The point is emphasized by Scrutchings v. Niner4 where
the parties entered into a partnership contract for the operation of a
restaurant and bar. The plaintiff partner was denied the right to recover
under the contract for his services, on the ground that he did not have a
liquor license. Presumably, he would also be barred from recovery by
means of an accounting or in quasi-contract.5
HUGH A. Ross
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Non-resident Owner v. Purchaser of Stolen Automobile
Although there is a trend in favor of protecting the bona fide pur-
chaser of real or personal property from claims of others based on tide or
lien, an exception to this trend is the bona fide purchaser whose tide to
tangible property other than money is derived from a thief. Therefore,
the decision of the court of appeals in Ohio Casialty Ins. Co. v. Guterman'
in favor of the Illinois owner of a stolen automobile against the Ohio bona
fide purchaser from a person who had an Ohio certificate of title to this
automobile is not surprising. A decision in favor of the bona fide pur-
chaser might have defeated the purpose of the Ohio motor vehicle certificate
of tide law, that is, to eliminate the market for stolen motor vehicles.
Holder of Dry Legal Title to Automobile v. Tortfeasor
Another case involving the Ohio motor vehicle certificate of tide law
is Cramer v. Fischer Bakery Co.2 In this case the person to whom the cer-
tificate of tide for an automobile had been issued sued a third person whose
truck damaged the automobile. The real owner of the automobile was a
minor who had taken tide in the name of a friend, the plaintiff. The
plaintiff as the insured received payment from the insurance company for
the amount of the damage less fifty dollars. The minor paid this fifty
dollars, all amounts due to -the vendor on the sale price and the premium
for insurance. When the plaintiff stated on cross-examination that he had
1163 Ohio St. 498, 127 N.E.2d 209 (1955).
297 Ohio App. 329, 125 N.E.2d 885 (1953).
OHio REv. CODE § 1775.06.
' 69 Ohio L. Abs. 233, 124 N.E.2d 754 (1952).
'Nahas v. George, 156 Ohio St. 52, 99 N.E.2d 898 (1951); Williams v. Williams,
95 Ohio App. 533, 121 N.E.2d 98 (1953).
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not been damaged, the common pleas court held that the plaintiff could
recover nothing. The court of appeals realized that the minor, who was
the real party in interest, could not sue because title to the automobile was
not in his name. Therefore, it properly allowed recovery in the name of
the plaintiff who was 'the holder of the dry legal title," and who, as trustee,
but not personally, had been damaged.
Notarization of Blank Application for Automobile Title
A third case involving a certificate of title to an automobile calls at-
tention to the tendency by large business concerns to treat Notary Public
Commissions as commercial conveniences and not as legal safeguards. The
common pleas court in State v. King3 refused to order the defendant derk
of courts to issue a certificate of title to an automobile because the applica-
tion had been executed by the notary public before it was signed by the
applicant.
The modern trend is to abolish the requirement that documents be
sworn to before a notary public 4 Therefore, lawyers should consider
whether the notarization of applications for certificates of title serves any
useful purpose. The substitute for notarization is a statute which makes
fraud or intentional misrepresentation with respect to certain documents
a crime.
Partition of Tangible Personal Property
If two or more persons own undivided interests as tenants in common
of tangible personal property which can not be divided easily, one of the
tenants in common may have the property divided by an action for partition
in the common pleas court. The partition action for the division of per-
sonal property is not statutory.
In Gornall v. Gornal5 the common pleas court overruled a demurrer
to an action for the partition of the inventory and miscellaneous equipment
of a grocery store.
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'97 Ohio App. 237, 125 N.E.2d 350 (1954).
'98 Ohio App. 25, 128 N.E.2d 161 (1953).
8129 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
'Applications for motor vehicle licenses do not have to be notarized. OmIo R v.
CODE § 4503.10 (1955 Supplement).
1129 N.B.2d 876 (Ohio Com. P1. 1954).
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